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The Current Medical Malpractice
Crisis: The Need for Reform to
Ensure a Tomorrow for Oregon’s
Obstetricians
Unpredictable and exorbitant jury awards have prompted in-surers to charge increasingly high rates to insure doctors in
high-risk practice areas.  Specialties that are typically at high-risk
for medical malpractice lawsuits include obstetrics, surgery, and
orthopedics.  The current crisis in medical malpractice litigation
has forced clinics and doctors unwilling to pay high insurance
rates to close their practices.  Part I of this Comment discusses
the medical malpractice crisis and how it has affected obstetri-
cians in Oregon.  Part II provides an overview of existing medical
malpractice law.  Part III explores possible reforms within the
current system, notably placing caps on non-economic damages.
This Part also discusses reforms outside the existing malpractice
system, specifically mandatory alternative dispute resolution or
adoption of a no-fault scheme.
This Comment emphasizes the need to reform the current sys-
tem by focusing on a narrow subset, specifically obstetricians in
Oregon.  The medical malpractice system exists to serve two pri-
mary goals: compensation of those injured, and deterrence of
negligence.1  As this Comment describes today’s medical mal-
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practice crisis in Oregon, it is clear that the current malpractice
system fails these goals.  Oregon’s failure to consistently compen-
sate victims of negligence or deter negligence is representative of
the national problem.2  This discordant system imposes costly
burdens on the health care system.  Lack of access to services
most adversely affects women, low-income earners, and rural re-
sidents.3  Insurance rates for practicing physicians have skyrock-
eted.  Rates are so high in certain specialties that services have
been discontinued.  This is especially true in the practice of ob-
stetrics, which has been subject to a high rate of claims and pay-
ments largely stemming from neurological birth-related injuries.4
A detailed examination of the effect of the current crisis on Ore-
gon’s obstetricians illustrates many of the medical malpractice
system’s shortcomings.
I
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CRISIS
A. Medical Malpractice in Oregon
The adverse experience of doctors and insurance providers, as
well as limited availability of patient services in Oregon, are
some of the major negative effects of the existing malpractice
system.  Oregon is one of nineteen states in the nation currently
in a medical malpractice crisis, according to a recent American
Medical Association report.5  Indicators used to determine this
include: increased insurance premiums, limited availability of
services, increased size of jury awards in malpractice cases, and
frequency of physicians relocating or closing their practice.6  As
of January 2003, there was a total of 465 suits pending against
doctors in Oregon.7  Nationally, the average jury award in a mal-




4 Frank A. Sloan et al., The Road from Medical Injury to Claims Resolution: How
No-Fault and Tort Differ, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 37 (Spring 1997).
5 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS’N, AMERICA’S MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS: A NA-
TIONAL VIEW 1 (2003), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/
378/backgrounders1.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL VIEW].
6 Id. at 14-15.
7 Videotape: Medical Malpractice Meltdown (Oregon Health Forum 2003) (on file
with Oregon Health Forum) [hereinafter Oregon Health Forum] (quoting speaker
Jim Dorigan, CEO, Nw. Physicians Mut. Ins. Co.).  Mr. Dorigan stated the total
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practice case increased 176% between 1994 and 2001, while in-
surance premiums doubled from 1991 to 2001.8
To limit jury awards, the Oregon legislature in 1987 imposed a
$500,000 cap on all non-economic damages for pain and suffer-
ing.9  But in 1999, the Oregon Supreme Court held the limits
were unconstitutional.10  Since the caps were struck down, statis-
tical evidence indicates that awards have increased 65%.11  In
2002, the average jury malpractice award in Oregon was $3.4
million.12
Oregon’s increasing jury award size and rising insurance pre-
miums, among the worst in the nation, have caused many doctors
to limit the services they provide.  Between 2001 and 2002, the
Medical Liability Monitor reported that Oregon doctors exper-
ienced one of the nation’s highest premium increases among at-
risk specialties—80%—which was surpassed only by Arkansas,
Mississippi, and Virginia.13
B. Neurologically Impaired Infant Claims
Obstetricians have been especially impacted by medical mal-
practice litigation.  On average, obstetricians face two lawsuits
per career, more than any other medical specialty.14  In Oregon,
one insurer reported the average damage claim for obstetric
cases was $9.5 million, versus an average damage claim for other
demand for these suits was $1,506,264,712. Id.  If all suits were to be cleared, the
average cost per doctor would be $334,726. Id.  However, it is unrealistic to assume
this amount would be paid, because the majority of suits are dismissed or settled.
Additionally, settlements will not necessarily be for the amount demanded.
8 SAXTON, supra note 1.
9 OR. REV. STAT. § 18.560 (1987), partially invalidated by Lakin v. Senco Prods.,
Inc., 329 Or. 62, 987 P.2d 463 (1999).  The statutory cap remains valid for wrongful
death claims.  The legislature also sent an initiative to voters to reinstate caps, but
voters rejected this. See infra notes 91-92.
10 Lakin, 329 Or. 62, 987 P.2d 463; see also NATIONAL VIEW, supra note 5, at 14.
11 OREGON MEDICAL ASS’N, TOP TEN THINGS TO KNOW ABOUT OREGON’S MED-
ICAL LIABILITY CRISIS, at http://www.theoma.org/Files/top_ten_things_to_know.doc
[hereinafter TOP TEN] (last visited June 12, 2005).
12 NATIONAL VIEW, supra note 5, at 14; see also OREGON MEDICAL ASS’N, FACT
SHEET ON MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM, at http://www.theoma.org/Files/Fact%
20Sheet.doc (last visited June 12, 2005).
13 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADDRESSING THE NEW HEALTH
CARE CRISIS: REFORMING THE MEDICAL LITIGATION SYSTEM TO IMPROVE THE
QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE 18 (2003), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/re-
ports/medliab.pdf [hereinafter QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE].  “At-risk” practice ar-
eas experiencing the highest premium increases are internal medicine, general
surgery, and obstetrics/gynecology. Id. at 17-18.
14 Id. at 8.
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medical malpractice suits of only $2.8 million.15  Consequently,
insurance premiums for obstetricians have risen dramatically in
recent years.  Analyzing this data per medical specialty, Oregon
obstetricians experienced the nation’s second-highest premium
increase.16  Oregon obstetricians’ increased premiums of 126%
were only surpassed by Ohio’s.17  In 1999, the average premium
for an obstetrician was $21,000, and by 2003 that figure had risen
to $61,000.18
The American College of Obstetricians estimates claims for
neurologically impaired infants compose 30% of all lawsuits filed
against obstetricians.19  Neurological injuries typically occur
when the baby’s brain receives too little oxygen at birth, a condi-
tion known as “asphyxia.”20  The consequences of asphyxia in-
clude stillbirth delivery, neonatal death, nerve damage, vision
impairment, mental retardation, and cerebral palsy.21  Treatment
for injured babies that survive can be costly and span a long pe-
riod.22  However, asphyxia-related injuries are not always the re-
sult of negligence.  Thus, some “bad baby” cases may be caused
by other conditions present at birth.  As one doctor explained,
“the outcome in these cases is always tragic—an injured or dead
baby.  But the fault for such a result does not always lie with the
doctor.”23  A January 2003 study found that:
[D]octors are often sued for brain damage that can result from
oxygen deprivation during delivery, even though the vast ma-
jority of such cases actually stem from infections and causes
that are beyond the control of physicians . . . suits are being
brought against doctors for brain damage and cerebral palsy
that were not caused by negligent care.24
15 Oregon Health Forum, supra note 7.
16 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SPECIAL UPDATE ON MEDICAL LIA-
BILITY CRISIS tbl.6 (2002), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/mlupd1.htm
(showing Oregon obstetrician premiums rose from $21,680 in 1998 to $48,942 in
2002) (last visited June 12, 2005).
17 Id.
18 Oregon Health Forum, supra note 7.
19 QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE, supra note 13, at 8; see also Mary A. Cavanaugh,
Bad Cures for Bad Babies: Policy Challenges to the Statutory Removal of the Com-
mon Law Claim for Birth-Related Neurological Injuries, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1299, 1312 (1993).
20 Cavanaugh, supra note 19, at 1312.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1313.
23 Telephone Interview with Anna Daniel, M.D., Seattle OB/GYN (Feb. 11,
2004).
24 QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE, supra note 13, at 8.
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The frequency and severity of malpractice liability for obstetri-
cians has significantly impacted the practice.  Damage awards in
obstetric-related cases tend to be higher than other malpractice
claims, which means insurers must protect high-risk physicians by
charging correspondingly high insurance.25  The American Medi-
cal Association has also linked higher premiums to increasing
fees for obstetric services.26  Soaring premiums have prompted
many Oregon obstetricians to discontinue services.  A recent Or-
egon Health Sciences University study of obstetric doctors found
that during the past four years, 125 physicians – 22% of all those
delivering in Oregon – stopped delivering babies.27  With contin-
uing high risk of lawsuits and insurance rates increasing, the
trend of limited obstetric services is sure to continue.  Over the
next five years, one in three delivering physicians in Oregon is
planning to quit delivering babies.28
C. Obstetric Services in Rural Oregon
Rural Oregon has been especially devastated.  Services have
been entirely eliminated in certain areas.  Rural patients in com-
munities such as John Day, Hermiston, and Roseburg have been
among the hardest hit.29  Many rural patients have no access to
obstetric services in their town, and of those that do have ser-
vices, such services are often limited.30  After an $8.5 million mal-
practice judgment against one of its doctors, Roseburg Women’s
Healthcare closed its offices at Mercy Medical Center.31  Insur-
ance rates were so astronomical for obstetricians that they were
simply unable to afford to deliver babies.  As one doctor ex-
plained, “[w]e were paying $17,000 per physician in 2001.  We
paid $24,000 for each doctor for the first six months of 2002, and
were quoted $80,000 to $100,000 per doctor per year going for-
ward.  Dr. Hollander would have to deliver 100 babies just to
cover malpractice insurance costs.”32
25 See Cavanaugh, supra note 19, at 1304.
26 Roger J. Bulgar & Victoria P. Rostow, Medical Professional Liability and the
Delivery of Obstetrical Care, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 81, 84 (1990).
27 TOP TEN, supra note 11.
28 Id.
29 Robin J. Moody, Doctors Taking Action on Premiums, BUS.  J. OF PORTLAND,
Jan. 10, 2003, at http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2003/01/13/story1.html.
30 See NATIONAL VIEW, supra note 5, at 14.
31 David Raths, Insurance Crisis Hits Oregon Doctors, BUS. J. OF PORTLAND, June
21, 2002, at http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2002/06/24/story1.html.
32 Id.
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The risk of liability affects not only obstetricians but insurance
providers as well.  Northwest Physicians Mutual, which insures
40% of doctors in Oregon, specializes in healthcare insurance for
doctors, clinics, and dentists in Oregon.33  Although it is one of
Oregon’s largest medical insurers, and the previous insurer of
Roseburg Women’s Healthcare, Northwest Physicians Mutual
will not write new policies to cover obstetric physicians.34  Such
polices have proven too costly; Northwest Physicians Mutual re-
ported losses of $12.5 million in 2001 and also reported losses in
1999 and 2000.35  Oregon’s medical insurers have felt the pinch
from increased losses paid out: in 1998, all Oregon insurers paid
a total of $15 million in losses, but in 2001 they paid over $60
million in losses.36
With no affordable insurance, doctors in rural communities are
often forced to close their doors.  A recent survey of Oregon
physicians found that nearly one-third of eastern Oregon physi-
cians are considering relocating their practice.37  Furthermore,
nearly 12% of those surveyed reported they have closed, or plan
to close or sell their practice due to high liability insurance
rates.38  This was the highest rate in the state, followed by south-
west Oregon.39  As Robbie Law, M.D., a family practice physi-
cian, explains, patients in many smaller communities are forced
to seek medical care in other towns or cities:
Four family physicians were providing all the OB care in our
community.  During the past five years, we have delivered
more than 200 babies with no claims, then our local surgeon,
who was backup for cesarean sections, relocated.  We were un-
able to recruit another surgeon because of high premiums and
fear of increasing risk of litigation.  We were forced to stop
delivering babies in Reedsport.  Now our patients have to
travel 30 to 40 minutes to get care—often in labor.  Many are
worried about getting there in time for delivery.  Many delay
getting timely prenatal care.  We are very concerned about the
loss of timely care and the risks to our community’s pregnant
33 Id. For background and details of Northwest Physicians Mutual Insurance
Company’s policies, see generally Northwest Physicians Mutual Insurance Co., http:/
/www.npmic.com (last visited June 12, 2005).
34 Raths, supra note 31.
35 Id.
36 Oregon Health Forum, supra note 7.
37 OREGON MEDICAL ASS’N, IS THERE A DOCTOR IN THE HOUSE?, http://www.
theoma.org/Files/OMA%20Packet.pdf [hereinafter IS THERE A DOCTOR IN THE
HOUSE?] (last visited June 12, 2005).
38 Id.
39 Id.
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mothers and children.40
Oregon’s high insurance rates have driven Oregon obstetri-
cians to states with lower premiums, such as Idaho.41  As one
doctor who left Eugene for Idaho stated, “[b]ecause of the high-
risk work I do, I am a target.  In this state, it’s open season on
doctors – neurosurgeons and obstetricians are a big-time market
for medical lawsuits, whether they’re just or not.”42  In neighbor-
ing Idaho, a state with caps on non-economic damages, obstetri-
cians can obtain insurance policies at the “bargain” price of
$20,000.43
Rural obstetricians who stay in Oregon are likely to refer the
complex, and potentially higher liability risk cases—those that
could lead to a large medical malpractice suit capable of closing
their entire practice—to physicians in urban areas who are able
to obtain insurance to perform high-risk procedures.44  In con-
trast, physicians in larger hospitals, typically located in urban ar-
eas, are less likely to lose insurance as a result of a single
malpractice incident.  Consequently, referral rates are highest in
rural parts of Oregon: central Oregon (18.8%), southwest Ore-
gon (25.5%), mid-Willamette Valley (28.2%), northwest Oregon
(29.2%), eastern Oregon (30%), and southern Oregon (30.9%).45
Perhaps most troubling about the current crisis in Oregon ob-
stetric care is that there is no sign of improvement.  The in-
creased risk of litigation for obstetricians practicing in the state
has also affected the next generation of doctors.  Concern over
litigation has adversely affected the opportunities in obstetrics
and gynecology for medical students and residents by limiting the
responsibilities they are given in training.46  Even more sobering,
at a recent medical school graduation in Oregon only two of 150




43 Berkeley Rice, Malpractice Rates: How High Now?, MED. ECON., Jan. 9, 2004,
at 57, available at http://www.memag.com/memag/article articleDetail.jsp?id108357.
44 IS THERE A DOCTOR IN THE HOUSE?, supra note 37.  Physicians in larger hospi-
tals, typically teaching hospitals located in urban areas, are less likely to lose insur-
ance as a result of a single malpractice incident.  Doctors in these hospitals are
usually covered by a comprehensive hospital insurance policy, which can better ab-
sorb a large judgment than an individual or a small clinic.
45 Id.
46 Bulgar & Rostow, supra note 26, at 86.
47 Raths, supra note 31.
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With the growing population and continuing need for obstetric
services, it is clear that the current system is failing both patients
and physicians.  The next section of this Comment examines the
current medical malpractice tort system and its effectiveness at
addressing the goals of deterring negligent conduct, preventing




A. The Current Medical Malpractice Tort System
Medical malpractice is a tort in which the party bringing suit
has suffered a medical injury and seeks to recover from the doc-
tor, hospital, or care provider.  Medical malpractice liability
arises when a doctor engages in negligent conduct, defined as
conduct “which falls below the standard established by law for
the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.”48
Medical malpractice claims are mainly governed by state law,
but similar legal standards apply across states.  Generally, there
are four elements to a malpractice claim: first, a duty of care es-
tablished by a physician-patient relationship; second, negligence
in failing to meet the proscribed standard of care; third, a causal
link between injury and the negligent act; and fourth, a resulting
actual injury.49
The most common basis for a medical malpractice tort suit is
failure to diagnose, which comprises an estimated 28% of all
claims.50  The next two most common grounds for a claim are
surgically-related injuries and improper treatment claims.51  Al-
though far less common than medical negligence, patients in
some cases sue doctors for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress (NIED).52
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).  Medical malpractice liability
also arises when a nurse or health care professional engages in negligent conduct.
However, for the purposes of this Comment, discussion is limited to medical mal-
practice against doctors.
49 SAXTON, supra note 1, at 2 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164-65 (5th ed. 1984)).
50 Id. at 8.
51 Id.
52 See Simons v. Beard, 188 Or. App. 370, 72 P.3d 96 (2003).  Although NIED
claims against doctors are relatively rare, they are used where the patient suffered
solely or mainly psychological injury.  Oregon does not require that the patient suf-
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There are typically two types of damages that may be awarded
in a medical malpractice case:
[E]conomic damages for the actual monetary losses due to
negligence such as medical expenses, lost wages, rehabilitation
costs or any other economic out of pocket loss suffered as the
result of a health care injury; and non-economic damages for
things such as pain and suffering, disfigurement, and loss of
companionship.53
B. Assessing the Standard of Care
The jury often serves as the decision-maker in medical mal-
practice litigation.  The right to trial by jury is guaranteed by the
Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.54  The rationale
behind this guarantee is that a jury of laypersons brings collective
experience which allows them to resolve disputes in a manner
that reflects community values.55  The modern jury has no requi-
fer a physical injury in order to bring an NIED claim.  In Simons, the plaintiff sued
an obstetrician and a hospital for negligent care that resulted in a miscarriage. Id. at
372, 72 P.3d at 98.  The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, and on
appeal the court, viewing the facts most favorably to the plaintiff, found that a rea-
sonable fact finder could find that:
[B]ecause of defendants’ negligence, plaintiff began labor with the abnor-
mal transverse lie uncorrected and the fetus in unmonitored distress, ex-
posing plaintiff to a “greatly increased” risk of death; and (2) but for
defendants’ negligence, plaintiff could have, and would have, either exper-
ienced a vaginal delivery of a live child or undergone an emergency
Cesarean section—and, thus, plaintiff would not have experienced the
physical trauma of her unnecessarily protracted and ultimately futile labor.
Id. at 377, 72 P.3d at 100.  The court held the plaintiff had an actionable claim re-
gardless of physical harm:
We are persuaded that, when the claim is that a medical practitioner
breached a professional duty to guard against a specific medical harm, the
fact that that harm is psychological rather than physical is not a bar to
liability.  Our holding should not be read to mean that medical profession-
als operate under a general duty to avoid any emotional harm that
foreseeably might result from their conduct. . . .  But, where the standard of
care in a particular medical profession recognizes the possibility of adverse
psychological reactions or consequences as a medical concern and dictates
that certain precautions be taken to avoid or minimize it, the law will not
insulate persons in that profession from liability if they fail in those duties,
thereby causing the contemplated harm.
Id. at 381, 72 P.3d at 102-03 (quoting Curtis v. MRI Imaging Servs. II, 327 Or. 9, 15-
16, 956 P.2d 960, 963 (1998)).
53 EMILY V. CORNELL, NGA CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, ISSUE BRIEF: ADDRESS-
ING THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS 5 (2002) (emphasis omitted).
54 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. (“In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”).
55 Jody Weisberg Menon, Adversarial Medical and Scientific Testimony and Lay
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site educational or training background.  Instead, the jury is
called upon not for its expertise, but to use its common sense to
assess the evidence brought forth at trial.
Historically, juries assessed the standard of care by accepted
local community norms, which in medical cases were usually de-
fined by expert medical witnesses practicing in the same local-
ity.56  But today, many jurisdictions, including Oregon, have
abandoned the locality standard of care and adopted a modified
locality rule.57  The modified locality rule allows experts practic-
ing in a similar community to testify.58  A few states have aban-
doned the locality rule entirely, and adopted a national
“reasonable physician” standard.59  “In these states . . . the jury
decides whether the physician behaved reasonably, not whether
she complied with custom.”60  By statute, Oregon mandates a
modified locality rule:
A physician or podiatric physician and surgeon licensed to
practice medicine or podiatry by the Board of Medical Exam-
iners for the State of Oregon has the duty to use that degree of
care, skill and diligence that is used by ordinarily careful phy-
sicians or podiatric physicians and surgeons in the same or
similar circumstances in the community of the physician or
podiatric physician and surgeon or a similar community.61
The modified locality rule is generally favored by doctors be-
cause it limits the number of possible experts who may testify to
those doctors practicing in a similar locale, whereas the national
standard allows any certified expert before the jury.  This na-
tional standard can greatly disadvantage doctors from smaller
communities where fewer specialists and sophisticated equip-
ment are available.
Jurors: A Proposal for Medical Malpractice Reform, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 281, 283
(1995).
56 HENRY COHEN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIA-
BILITY REFORM: LEGAL ISSUES AND FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF CAPS ON PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AND NONECONOMIC DAMAGES 1 (2003).
57 See Creasey v. Hogan, 292 Or. 154, 165, 637 P.2d 114, 121 (1981); see also Jay M.
Zitter, Annotation, Standard of Care Owed to Patient by Medical Specialist as Deter-
mined by Local, “Like Community,” State, National, or Other Standards, 18 A.L.R.
4TH 603 § 4 (1982) (defining the modified locality rule).
58 Creasey, 292 Or. at 165, 637 P.2d at 121.
59 Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87 IOWA
L. REV. 909, 913-14 (2002).
60 Id. at 916.
61 OR. REV. STAT. § 677.095(1) (2003).
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C. Assessing Damages
Generally, the goal of damages is to restore a party, as much as
possible, to the position they were in before the injury.62  Medi-
cal malpractice damage awards typically consist of economic and
non-economic damages, and although uncommon, patients may
also seek punitive damages.63  Juries are typically advised by ex-
perts regarding life expectancy, lost earnings, and other factors
that guide them in determining economic damages.  In contrast,
juries’ determination of non-economic damages, paid to compen-
sate pain and suffering, are far more discretionary and unpredict-
able.  Non-economic damages in most neurological obstetric
injury cases constitute nearly half the damage award.64  There are
several possible explanations for consistently high non-economic
damage awards: first, both the parents and infant are being com-
pensated; second, the jury lacks guidance in determining non-ec-
onomic damages; and third, the jury is sympathetic to a severely
injured infant.65
D. Critiquing the Tort System
Proponents of the existing tort system contend that it allows
for severely injured patients to be adequately compensated for
injuries caused by medical negligence.  However, several studies
of jury verdicts and settlements indicate the medical malpractice
system fails on this count.  “A defining feature of the medical
liability system is that most events of malpractice do not result in
a legal claim, and most claims of malpractice are not tied to any
act of negligence.”66  The comprehensive Harvard Medical Prac-
tice Study found that 3.7% of all hospitalizations result in an ad-
verse event, and 27.6% of adverse events were caused by
62 3 WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 331 (2d ed. 2005).
63 Punitive damages “can be awarded to a plaintiff in addition to compensatory
damages where a defendant’s conduct is particularly willful, wanton, malicious” and
are “awarded not as compensation, but to punish the wrongdoer and act as a deter-
rent to others who might engage in similar conduct.” Id.  Punitive damages are ex-
tremely rare in medical malpractice cases, and between 1999 and 2001 they occurred
in only 2% of all cases.  SAXTON, supra note 1, at 8.  However, despite their infre-
quency, punitive damages have a significant impact because they are typically very
large. Id.  A survey of punitive damages awarded in one year found that the average
amount awarded was $2.5 million. Id.
64 Cavanaugh, supra note 19, at 1304.
65 Id. at 1341 n.287.
66 SAXTON, supra note 1, at 3.
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negligence.67  Current evidence suggests that nearly 40% of mal-
practice claims are non-meritorious.68  The inference to be drawn
from these findings is that the tort system does not ensure claims
will be filed in the most egregious negligence cases, nor does it
keep frivolous claims based on an adverse event, but not negli-
gence, from being filed.69
This prompts the question of what motivates a claimant to go
to trial where negligence is not the cause of injury.  One possible
answer is that miscommunication between doctor and patient
leads to a lack of trust.  Thus, in cases where there is an unin-
tended result and little communication between the patient and
doctor, trust breaks down and the frustrated patient blames the
doctor.  One study confirmed that “erosion of trust is both one of
the causes and one of the consequences of the medical profes-
sional liability crisis in obstetrics.”70  As with many other surgical
practices, obstetricians are subject to ever-increasing record-
keeping and regulatory demands, as well as unpredictable inter-
ruptions for deliveries and procedures, which may prevent them
from having adequate time to spend with all of their patients.  A
recent study found 86% of physicians felt they were not able to
spend adequate time with their patients.71  Despite the fact that
the average physician works longer hours today than five years
ago, most physicians today feel pressed for time between the in-
creased procedures, tests, and paperwork they must manage.72
Another explanation, more likely held by many doctors, is that
the practice of medicine is an imperfect and sometimes danger-
ous science.  Because what doctors do is risky but also necessary,
adverse events will inevitably occur even among the best of doc-
tors.  The problem is how to assure good doctors continue to
practice while adequately compensating negligently injured pa-
67 Abstract, T.A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in
Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 370 (1991), available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/abstract/324/6/
370.
68 Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203, 207 (1996).
69 The increase of managed care, in which patients are likely to be treated by
multiple doctors instead of one, is believed to be one reason for the high number of
non-meritorious claims.
70 Bulgar & Rostow, supra note 26, at 90-91.
71 Michael D. Sorkin, Doctors Feel Pinched on Time with Patients,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 12, 2003, at A1.  This may be partially attributed to
the rise of managed care.
72 Id.
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tients.  As one doctor explained, “[i]f error were due to a subset
of dangerous doctors, you might expect malpractice cases to be
concentrated among a small group, but in fact they follow a uni-
form, bell-shaped distribution.”73  Many commonly performed
procedures are difficult and complicated, sometimes involving a
team of doctors and medical students.  While this is no excuse for
negligent behavior, the problem does not seem to be one of “re-
peat offenders.”74  The teaching hospital system certainly is not
perfect, but as one doctor explains it is not the likely culprit of
the negligence crisis:
In medicine, we have long faced a conflict between the imper-
ative to give patients the best possible care and the need to
provide novices with experience.  Residencies attempt to miti-
gate potential harm through supervision and graduated re-
sponsibility.  And there is reason to think patients actually
benefit from teaching.  Studies generally find teaching hospi-
tals have better outcomes than non-teaching hospitals.75
While medicine will never be a perfect science, medical train-
ing presents a great opportunity for doctors in training to learn
from others’ errors and prevent repeat mistakes.  Increased error
reporting and quality assessment programs enable doctors to
learn from mistakes, but such programs widely vary between
hospitals.76
Another feature of the malpractice tort system, according to
proponents, is that it purportedly identifies bad behavior by neg-
ligent physicians, often removing them from practice.  Con-
versely, some physicians favor litigation as a method to “clear
their names” and avoid disciplinary consequences.77  Disciplinary
consequences include employment termination, license revoca-
tion, and limitation of services or practices.
Since 1990, all malpractice settlements and judgments are re-
ported to the National Practitioner Data Bank.78  The Data Bank
provides a record of malpractice claims that may be searched by
hospitals, doctors, and other interested parties.79  The effective-
ness of the Data Bank in identifying and leading to the removal
73 ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON’S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT
SCIENCE 56 (2003).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 24.
76 Interview with Anna Daniel, M.D., supra note 23.
77 Metzloff, supra note 68, at 205.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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of negligent doctors is dubious.  Consequently, physicians may be
hesitant to reach a settlement that will be reported to the Data
Bank, and may prefer to go to trial in cases when evidence of
negligence is questionable.80  It is important to note that the
Data Bank covers only incidents that are litigated or settled.
Thus it does not include all known medical errors, and does not
encourage doctors to report all mistakes.  A better and more
transparent model would be a reporting system that allowed doc-
tors to identify and learn from common mistakes, even those that
were not litigated or settled, thereby more effectively deterring
negligence.
Tort claimants who have filed claims have several criticisms of
the existing system.  One comprehensive study of medical claim-
ant’s satisfaction with the tort system found these major criti-
cisms: high overhead in claim resolution, typically due to high
lawyer’s fees; delays associated with court resolution; and an in-
crease in the practice of defensive medicine.81
In summary, the medical malpractice tort system too often fails
to meet its goals: to deter negligence, to punish the wrongdoer,
and to compensate the injured.  Its inconsistent application leads
to disparate results that are often frustrating to involved doctors
and patients, especially the most severely injured.  Finally, the
tort litigation system fails to encourage reporting of mistakes and
does not promote improved healthcare services.  These short-
comings indicate the need for an improved system that more ef-
fectively meets these goals and seeks improved delivery of health
care services.
III
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM PROPOSALS
Numerous state and federal reforms have been proposed in re-
sponse to the current medical malpractice crisis.  Among the
most common are caps limiting the amount of damages that may
be awarded.  This section will examine proposals to reform the
existing medical malpractice system by enacting caps on non-eco-
nomic damages.  This section will also discuss reform proposals
80 Id. at 206.
81 Sloan et al., supra note 4, at 36.  Defensive medicine is “understood to mean
unnecessary care given by physicians in response to the filing of lawsuits by pa-
tients.” Id.
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outside the existing medical malpractice system: mandating alter-
native dispute resolution or enacting a no-fault structure.
A. Non-Economic Damages Caps
One common medical malpractice reform is to limit the
amount of damages that a prevailing party may receive.  Caps are
the most tested medical malpractice reform currently in use
among states and have been enacted at varying levels in several
states.  In 1987, the Oregon Legislature enacted Oregon Revised
Statutes section 18.560, which imposed a $500,000 cap on non-
economic damages.82  Then in 1999, in Lakin v. Senco Products,
the Oregon Supreme Court struck down the $500,000 cap on
non-economic damages as violating the constitutionally pro-
tected right to trial by jury.83  However, the cap survived for
wrongful death actions because no common law right to a jury
trial exists for this statutorily-created action.84
The effectiveness of non-economic damage caps in reforming
the medical malpractice system is widely debated.  Many sup-
porters of caps argue they are effective in preventing huge and
unpredictable jury awards.  By limiting liability exposure, caps
encourage scientific innovation and prevent excessive deterrence
of valuable medical research.85  Critics respond that caps only re-
strict damage awards for the most seriously injured claimants.
As one critic of caps noted, there is an “inherently regressive na-
ture of caps on damages, particularly for pain and suffering.
Such caps give rise to vertical inequity among plaintiffs by impos-
ing their limits only upon the damages awarded to the most se-
verely injured victims.”86  While it is clear that the most seriously
injured suffer the most under caps, the American Medical Asso-
ciation defends reasonable caps as an effective method of limit-
ing insurance premiums, thereby ensuring patients have access to
healthcare services.87
82 OR. REV. STAT. § 18.560 (1987), partially invalidated by Lakin v. Senco Prods.,
Inc., 329 Or. 62, 987 P.2d 463 (1999).
83 Id. at 81, 987 P.2d at 474.
84 Id. at 77, 987 P.2d at 472.
85 Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of Justice Through National Punitive
Damage Reform, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1573, 1622 (1997).
86 David M. Studdert et al., Can the United States Afford a “No-Fault” System of
Compensation for Medical Injury?, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 17 (Spring 1997).
87 Donald J. Palmisano, Letter to the Editor, AMA to The Wall Street Journal
Online: Caps on Non-Economic Damages Can Work, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Sept. 19,
2003, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/3289-8023.html.
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The effectiveness of caps in limiting insurance premiums and
preventing doctors from closing their practices or limiting ser-
vices is hotly debated.  However, comparisons of average doctor
premium rates between states with caps and without caps indi-
cates that, as one would expect, caps do affect insurance premi-
ums.  The Medical Liability Monitor divided states into three
groups: states with caps on damages over $250,000, states with
caps at $350,000, and states without caps.  The comparison results
showed the average premium increase between 2001 and 2002 for
the first group with caps was 26%, and for the second group with
slightly higher caps was 18%.88  The third group, states without
caps, had the highest average premium increase, at 45%.89  Thus,
caps very likely limit doctors’ premiums.
While caps prevent exorbitant awards, it is difficult to measure
the effect of caps on doctors’ practices and the availability of ser-
vices.  It is clear that awards in Oregon have increased since caps
were removed in 1999.  The Oregon Medical Association found
that since caps were struck down, the average court settlement
has increased 65%.90  Many doctors believe caps were effective
in lowering the amount of their liability risk, and a strong tort
reform lobby continues to push for reinstatement of damage
limits.
Twice in the past five years Oregon voters have weighed in on
this issue.  Voters were given an opportunity to reinstate non-
economic damages caps, but rejected this proposal—Measure
81—in the May 2000 primary election.91  Despite strong support
from the Oregon Medical Association, the measure failed by a
landslide, but a group of Oregon physicians continued to raise
money to lobby the state legislature for tort reform.92  Two
McMinnville doctors contacted other interested physicians to
raise $50,000 for tort reform.93  Dr. Klaus Martin, who has
88 QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE, supra note 13, at 23.
89 Id.
90 Robin J. Moody, Doctors Eye Malpractice Ballot Measure, BUS. J. OF PORT-
LAND, Jan. 7, 2003, at http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2003/01/06/daily
12.html.
91 Oregon State Measure 81, Primary Election, May 16, 2000, at http://www.sos.
state.or.us/elections/may162000/m81.htm.
92 Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of Am., Oregon Voters Reject Caps on Civil Damage
Awards, at http://www.atla.org/homepage/oregon.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
The measure’s vote totals: Yes votes: 219,009 and No votes: 650,348.  Oregon State
Measure 81, supra note 91.
93 Moody, supra note 90.
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spearheaded the lobby fundraising, explained the effort was to
prevent a situation where a doctor says “by the way, we are no
longer delivering babies.”94  Many obstetricians believe caps are
the only way to continue offering all services.
Measure 35, a proposed state constitutional amendment im-
posing a $500,000 cap on non-economic damages, was recently
defeated in the November 2004 election by a narrow margin of
51% to 49%.95  The close result in the Measure 35 race was not
surprising given the millions that were spent leading up to the
November election.  Those in support of Measure 35 spent over
$5 million, while the opposition reportedly raised nearly $2 mil-
lion.96  The arguments advanced by each side were familiar to
voters.  Trial lawyers and others opposed to the measure advo-
cated that the imposition of caps would remove the patient’s
right to full compensation.97  Doctors and other Measure 35 sup-
porters argued that without caps, high malpractice risk and rising
insurance premiums would restrict access to medical care, espe-
cially for doctors providing high-risk services such as delivering
babies.98  Consequently, the recent rejection of Measure 35 indi-
cates alternative reforms must be considered in Oregon.
Although the Oregon Legislature has not been able to rein-
state caps since Lakin, they have responded with limited relief.
In 2003, the Oregon House of Representatives unanimously
passed House Bill 3630, a bill that limits premiums for rural doc-
tors.99  It offers relief to 1000 of Oregon’s 7500 rural physi-
cians.100  For those who receive relief under the bill, it is
significant: “premium rates [are reduced 80%] for doctors spe-
cializing in obstetrics, [60%] for family-practice doctors who pro-
vide obstetric care and [40%] for all other rural physicians.”101
94 Id.
95 Oregon State Measure 35, General Election, Nov. 2, 2004, at http://www.sos.
state.or.us/elections/nov22004/abstract/m35.pdf.  The vote total was 896,857 No
votes and 869,054 Yes votes. Id.
96 Friends, Foes of Oregon Ballot Measures Pull Out Wallets to Influence Outcome,
THE REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Oct. 22, 2004, at A1.
97 David Steves, Physicians’ Push and Lawyers’ Pull Leaves Patients in Middle,
THE REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Oct. 3, 2004, at A1.
98 Id.
99 H.B. 3630, 72nd Leg., 2003 Sess. (Or. 2003) (amending OR. REV. STAT.
§ 656.632 (2003)); Robin J. Moody, Relief on the Way for Rural Docs, BUS. J. OF
PORTLAND, June 20, 2003, at http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2003/06/23/
story2.html.
100 Moody, supra note 99.
101 Id.
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The bill aims to provide temporary relief and contains a sunset
provision so the program expires four years from the date of
passage.102
House Bill 3630 has been criticized by the state’s private insur-
ers because it requires that the State Accident Insurance Fund
(SAIF) provide medical insurance to doctors.  SAIF was chosen
because it is state owned and has the ability to administer pay-
ments.103  Under the bill’s language, SAIF pays a fee to the
state’s Department of Consumer and Business Services for oper-
ating costs, and $10 million from those fees would fund the rein-
surance account.104  Jim Dorigan, CEO of Oregon’s largest
physician insurance provider, criticizes the bill as being nothing
more than a state subsidy.105  Oregon’s private healthcare insur-
ers are concerned the bill will eventually push private insurers
out of the market, replacing them with a state agency.  While this
bill does provide some relief, it is criticized for being too tempo-
rary and limited in its coverage to bring significant relief to Ore-
gon obstetricians.
It is clear caps on non-economic damages affect insurance
rates, especially for doctors in high-risk liability practices.  How-
ever, caps will continue to be strongly criticized as most signifi-
cantly impacting recovery for the most severely injured.
Although the Oregon Legislature has had some success in more
specialized legislation, it has focused on limiting premiums, not
damages.  This will provide some much needed immediate relief,
but due to state budgetary constraints it is not a promising long-
term solution.  Given the Oregon Supreme Court’s strong lan-
guage regarding caps in Lakin, efforts to reinstate caps on non-
economic damages would likely face future challenges in the
courts and prove to be a short-lived, and thus ultimately inade-
quate reform.
B. Alternative Dispute Resolution
Another proposal to limit medical malpractice litigation is to
enact authorization for binding decisions through alternative dis-
pute resolution (ADR).  While many medical malpractice cases
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parties even attempt to reach an agreement through binding me-
diation or arbitration.  There are several states that have enacted
legislation to allow or require ADR.106  ADR may be an excel-
lent mechanism for removing from tort litigation some cases that
do not involve major negligence.107
Two methods of ADR could be used in medical malpractice
cases: mediation or arbitration.  Mediation is a method of resolv-
ing disputes where the parties, and in some cases their attorneys,
meet with a disinterested mediator to resolve their dispute.108
Mediation emphasizes the parties’ understanding of the dispute
and possible solutions, but does not rely on applicable principles
of law.109  The mediator’s role in this process is one of a
facilitator, not a judge or evaluator of the merits of the dis-
pute.110  Typically, mediation is more effective between dispu-
tants with a long-standing prior relationship and a desire to
continue their relationship.111  There are varying models in medi-
ation: in the judge-led model, parties are in separate rooms, and
the judge serves as a negotiator between the parties; in the inter-
est-based model, parties are typically in the same room, and the
mediator’s role is to facilitate communication and allow them to
develop a resolution.
In contrast, an arbitrator’s role is more like that of a judge or
jury.  Arbitration is typically a binding process, often court-or-
dered, in which the arbitrator evaluates the merits of the case.112
Arbitration may vary based on the following variables: length of
the arbitration hearing, the number and qualifications of arbitra-
106 Micheal Ahearn, Student Piece, Medical Malpractice Arbitration, WIDENER
UNIV. ONLINE J. ARB., MEDIATION, NEGOT. & COMPLEMENTARY DISP. RESOL.
TECHNIQUES (2001), available at http://www.adrlawinfo.com/medmal.html.  States
allowing some form of arbitration are: Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Texas, and Wisconsin.  Jurisdictions requiring some form of arbitration:
Alaska, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.
107 Leonard J. Marcus & Barry C. Dorn, Mediation Before Malpractice Suits?,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 27, 2000, available at 2000 WLNR 6244699.
108 Thomas B. Metzloff, Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies in Medical Mal-
practice, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 429, 440 (1992).
109 Metzloff, Unrealized Potential, supra note 68, at 218.
110 Id. at 218.
111 Id. at 219.  However, with the growth of managed care, patients are less likely
to have an ongoing relationship with one doctor, and are instead treated by a team
of doctors.
112 Id. at 204 & n.5.
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tors, and the amount of discovery conducted in the arbitration.113
There are several advantages to ADR over litigation.  A major
advantage of ADR is that it provides parties the freedom to
reach a more creative solution than mere economic and non-eco-
nomic damages.  One study of mediation in medical malpractice
cases found that patients have three desires, which are not always
met in tort suit: first, a complete explanation of the event at issue
and why it happened; second, an acknowledgement or even apol-
ogy from the caregiver; and third, an assurance that steps will be
taken so that the event will not happen again.114  ADR may pro-
duce a more satisfying result for the parties by addressing the
patient’s desires.  Finally, ADR saves both parties the costs of
going to trial, and provides parties with a better opportunity to
discuss the event and its outcome.
The main disadvantage of ADR is that it may be disastrous in
cases where parties are very emotional and unwilling to listen to
each other.  It also removes the stigmatic blame element, which
some parties may be so driven by that they are unwilling to settle
any issues outside court.  Some critics of mandatory ADR posit
that it would merely serve as a “band-aid” for the inadequate tort
system, and it would not effectively address the malpractice
crisis.115
Another consideration in evaluating mandatory ADR is that
its constitutionality would likely be challenged under the Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury and the Oregon Constitution as
a deprivation of the right to trial.116  However, states could allay
this constitutional concern by merely requiring that parties at-
tempt ADR, instead of requiring that they reach an agreement
113 Id. at 204.
114 Marcus & Dorn, supra note 107.
115 Metzloff, supra note 68, at 216.
116 See HENRY COHEN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, FEDERAL TORT REFORM
LEGISLATION: CONSTITUTIONALITY AND SUMMARIES OF SELECTED STATUTES 7-8
(2003).
Traditional tort actions, however, such as medical malpractice and products
liability, are not federal causes of action; they are governed by state law,
even when they are brought in federal court on diversity grounds.  State
laws generally provide for jury trials in tort cases brought in state courts,
and the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution generally
provides for jury trials of cases arising under state law that are brought in
federal court.  The question has arisen, therefore, as to the extent to which
the Constitution permits Congress to require alternative dispute resolution
in federal or state forums, of tort claims arising under state law.
Id.
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by ADR.  Thus, parties may reserve the option to go to trial after
attempting resolution through ADR if they are unable to reach
agreement.
There are few studies comparing the effectiveness of ADR
versus litigation in resolving medical malpractice disputes, reduc-
ing costs, and saving time.  One recent study conducted by the
United States General Accounting Office compared litigation
and arbitration results.117  The study found that plaintiffs pre-
vailed slightly more often in arbitration than litigation, and that
arbitration was less time consuming.118  In addition to this study,
health care provider Kaiser Permanente in California has used
arbitration for its subscribers since the 1970s, and its general re-
sults indicate arbitration leads to faster and more just resolution
of disputes than litigation.119  However, there are no comprehen-
sive comparisons proving that ADR is significantly more success-
ful than litigation.
Encouraging parties to use ADR would have the positive ef-
fect of removing from the tort litigation system those cases which
can be resolved between the parties.  Additionally, as one physi-
cian explained from experience, mandatory ADR would facili-
tate and encourage parties to communicate, which in turn
improves medical care and a patient’s emotional recovery.120  Dr.
Anna Daniel, an obstetrician, explained that she supports
mandatory ADR because she has seen the effect of litigation on
many doctors in her field:
There are occasional cases where it is clear the wrong decision
was made.  But in most cases, patients are unable to accept
that outcomes are unpredictable.  Lawsuits after unexpected
outcomes may have more to do with miscommunication or
poor patient-physician relationships than the actual event.  It
is an exhausting, destructive experience for both the patient
and the doctor.  Physicians involved in lengthy trials often
choose to leave clinical medicine or retire so that they never
have to repeat the experience.121
At a minimum, a well-designed mandatory ADR program may
provide parties with an option other than settlement to avoid
117 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: FEW CLAIMS RE-
SOLVED THROUGH MICHIGAN’S VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION PROGRAM, GAO/
HRD-91-38 (1990), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat8/143016.pdf.
118 Id. at 8; Metzloff, supra note 68, at 214.
119 Metzloff, supra note 68, at 214.
120 Interview with Anna Daniel, M.D., supra note 23.
121 Id.
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trial.  It is difficult to imagine replacing tort litigation entirely
with ADR because there are cases that will not be resolved or
settled without litigation.  But there is a role for ADR in many
cases to “encourage the type of constructive talking and listening
that we need if we are going to help our health system heal it-
self.”122  ADR is more likely than tort to encourage good behav-
ior by allowing patients and doctors an opportunity to effectively
communicate.
Mediation and arbitration are successfully used in many cases
today, where the parties voluntarily participate.  One judge who
frequently mediates medical malpractice cases in Lane County,
Oregon, questions whether it is necessary to enact legislation
making mediation or arbitration mandatory because forcing par-
ties into ADR before trial will have little effect if the parties are
unwilling.123  Judge Lyle Velure explained “arbitration can be in-
effective because neither party wants to make their case if they
are going to trial” and will have to make their case a second
time.124  Thus, in Judge Velure’s experience, insurers will only
participate in arbitration if it is non-binding and they can appeal
the decision.125  Similarly, mediation is most effective when the
parties are both voluntary participants, motivated by a desire to
both spare the cost of trial and settle the case more quickly.  As
Judge Velure noted, any case for less than a quarter-million dol-
lars will not be worth trying because of the costs associated with
trial, and therefore ADR is an effective alternative.126
ADR may enable parties a chance to revisit the facts, acknowl-
edge where missteps and miscommunications were made, and it
tends to limit the strain on courts by weeding out some cases that
may be resolved without litigation.  One commentator’s recom-
mendation is to implement an ADR model that is specifically de-
signed to address malpractice claims.127  Such a model would: (1)
be tailored to produce decisions on the merits; (2) focus upon
early identification of non-meritorious claims; (3) utilize deci-
sion-makers skilled in understanding the evidence; (4) promote
consistent damage awards; and (5) reduce costs through
122 Marcus & Dorn, supra note 107.





127 Metzloff, supra note 108, at 447-48.
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efficiency.128
To encourage arbitration or mediation, many jurisdictions have
enacted legislation to mandate that parties attempt or agree to
resolve their dispute through such a process.129  While some hos-
pitals do mandate private arbitration to resolve disputes, a more
comprehensive state statute requiring attempted mediation or ar-
bitration before trial would have a greater effect.  This would
ease the strain on courts, alleviate the physician’s concern about
liability, and most importantly, allow injured parties to reach a
reasonable settlement without the cost and time associated with
trial.  Finally, depending upon the structure of mandatory ADR
legislation, the goals of deterring negligence and adequately
compensating the most injured may be more appropriately met
than under tort.  It is likely that in successfully resolved ADR
cases both parties will be more satisfied with a solution they
helped create.
C. No-Fault
The final proposal discussed in this Comment is to impose a
no-fault system, similar to workers’ compensation.  Of all the
proposals discussed, this proposal requires the most radical over-
haul of the current tort litigation system.  This could be accom-
plished in one of two ways: first, by removing all cases from tort
litigation, as is the practice in Sweden; or second, the no-fault
system could be structured to divert certain types of cases to no-
fault compensation while reserving the litigation option for other
cases.  As will be discussed, the latter is a more realistic option
given the litigious environment in the United States.
1. Advantages and Disadvantages
There are several advantages of no-fault compensation systems
as compared with traditional litigation.  First, no-fault appropri-
ately compensates by allowing more people to collect, and by re-
ducing the cost and time for filing a claim.130  Second, claimants
in a no-fault system are likely to receive payment faster.131
128 Id.
129 See Ahearn, supra note 106; see also Note, Mandatory Mediation and Sum-
mary Jury Trial: Guidelines for Ensuring Fair and Effective Processes, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1086, 1090 n.33 (1990).
130 Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory
and Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 70 (1998).
131 Id. at 71.
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Third, claimants are more likely to get an award reflecting the
severity of their injury.132  Fourth, compensation is more effi-
ciently managed through an administrative agency that is able to
make periodic payments of benefits.133  Finally, replacing the ex-
isting malpractice structure with a no-fault system would likely
ease the burden of high insurance premiums on physicians.  The
imposition of no-fault would have a significant impact on practice
areas that involve high-risk procedures and require high premi-
ums.  Thus, a justification for limiting no-fault exclusively to ob-
stetric cases is the “unique impact of the increased frequency and
severity of obstetric injury claims on the practice of
obstetrics.”134
Critics of no-fault, notably plaintiff’s attorneys, argue it would
shortchange victims who could fare better under the existing tort
system.  Critics also argue that imposition of a no-fault system
would remove the fault-finding aspect of a tort case, which com-
pels physicians to act with due care.135  Consequently, a no-fault
system would not deter negligence, because obstetricians and
other doctors’ liability would not be tied to mistakes.136  Addi-
tionally, no-fault would prove unsatisfactory in comparison to
tort suits for those patients seeking retribution.
Another criticism of no-fault is its feasibility.  Specifically,
would all medical acts or omissions be compensated as medical
events, or merely those listed as medical negligence injuries?137
There are a number of potential factors that might influence the
answer to this question: pre-existing conditions, experimental
procedures, residents or medical students at teaching hospitals,
and complexity of the procedure.  Unlike workers’ compensa-
tion, the range of potentially compensable events in a broad
medical malpractice no-fault system makes implementation of
such a system a daunting task.  One response to this is to narrow
possible compensable events, and list those injuries that will be
compensated, a process similar to no-fault automobile
compensation.
The cost advantages of a no-fault medical malpractice compen-
sation system have been widely disputed.  Critics of the no-fault
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Cavanaugh, supra note 19, at 1303.
135 Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 130, at 73.
136 Cavanaugh, supra note 19, at 1304.
137 See Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 130, at 74.
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model argue that the system would be too costly because it would
compensate a larger pool of recipients.138  Although a no-fault
system would inevitably compensate a larger pool, proponents of
the system argue it would more equitably distribute awards and
would still cost less than litigation because of lower administra-
tive costs.139
2. Varying Models of No-Fault Compensation
Two no-fault models are used in the United States today:
workers’ compensation and automobile compensation.140  Work-
ers’ compensation applies to all injuries and illnesses occurring in
the course of employment.141  The system was adopted to protect
employers from unpredictable litigation, deter injury in the
workplace, promote workplace safety, and ensure compensation
for all injured.142  One model of a no-fault medical malpractice
compensation system parallels workers’ compensation:
Claims are filed with an expert panel of impartial physicians
who review claims and to determine if the injury fits the defi-
nition established.  Set time periods are established for the
panel to make a determination.  Compensation is limited to
net economic losses only (i.e. no pain and suffering), which
includes medical expenses, hospital and rehabilitative costs,
lost wages, and reasonable attorney fees.  These systems are
designed for a specific type of injury such as birth-related inju-
ries.  All injured patients are compensated regardless of the
culpability of the provider.  This system removes narrowly de-
fined catastrophic injuries from the tort system.  It can be
funded with state dollars and assessments on doctors and
hospitals.143
Programs adopting this or similar models exist in Virginia,
Florida, Sweden, and New Zealand.  One variation among no-
138 Studdert et al., supra note 86, at 2.
139 Id. at 3.
140 Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 130, at 65-67.  Automobile no-fault compensa-
tion varies by state, but usually covers injuries arising out of operating a motor vehi-
cle.  However, unlike workers’ compensation, automobile no-fault does not
compensate all events, but instead is narrowed to cover only certain injuries.  Auto-
mobile injuries are measured on a severity threshold, in which the most severely
injured are not constrained by the no-fault system.  Instead, those severe injuries
above the threshold fall within the tort system.  The rationale behind automobile no-
fault is to reduce the high costs of tort law and insurance in automobile accident
cases. Id. at 66-67.
141 Id. at 66.
142 Id. at 64-66, 76-78.
143 CORNELL, supra note 53, at 6-7.
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fault models is damages for pain and suffering, which are not
compensable under workers’ compensation.144
The first no-fault medical compensation system established in
the United States was the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological
Injury Compensation Program, also known as the Birth Injury
Fund.145  Virginia’s no-fault system was implemented in the late
1980s, amidst concern over large, unpredictable awards for se-
verely brain-damaged newborns that came to be known as “bad
baby” cases.146  Previous to its current no-fault system, Virginia
had a $1 million cap on damages that was struck down as uncon-
stitutional in a case that awarded $8.3 million in damages.147
Medical malpractice insurers reacted by withdrawing from the
market, saying they would not insure obstetricians unless they
were insulated from the bad baby cases.148  In response, the Vir-
ginia legislature enacted legislation to create a no-fault compen-
sation system for specific neurological birth-related injuries.149
One year after Virginia enacted this legislation, Florida enacted
similar legislation to create a no-fault compensation system for
neurological infant injuries.150
Virginia’s program was created to ensure that lifetime pay-
ments would be guaranteed to eligible children without litigation,
and additionally to allow Virginia obstetricians to continue pro-
viding full services.151  The system limits compensable injuries by
definition:
“Birth-related neurological injury” means injury to the brain
or spinal cord of an infant caused by the deprivation of oxygen
or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery
or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hos-
pital which renders the infant permanently motorically dis-
abled and (i) developmentally disabled or (ii) for infants
sufficiently developed to be cognitively evaluated, cognitively
disabled.  In order to constitute a “birth-related neurological
injury” within the meaning of this chapter, such disability shall
144 See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 6 (6th ed. 2003).
145 Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 130, at 82-83.
146 Id. at 83.
147 Cavanaugh, supra note 19, at 1315; see also Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781,
789 (W.D. Va. 1986) (mem.) (holding that a damage cap infringed the state and
federal constitutional right to jury trial).
148 Cavanaugh, supra note 19, at 1316.
149 Id.
150 See generally Sloan et al., supra note 4, at 38-39.
151 CORNELL, supra note 53, at 7.
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cause the infant to be permanently in need of assistance in all
activities of daily living.152
Additionally, the Act was limited to live births, and specifically
disqualifies injuries caused by genetic or congenital abnormality,
degenerative neurological disease, or maternal substance
abuse.153  Although the program does not provide compensation
for pain and suffering, it does compensate for lost earnings.154
For qualifying injuries, the Birth Injury Fund covers: “‘medi-
cally necessary and reasonable expenses’ of medical and hospital,
rehabilitative, residential and custodial care and service, special
equipment and facilities.”155  The Fund also pays lost wages to
eligible recipients upon reaching age eighteen.156  It is important
to note that the Virginia system does not cover all obstetric inju-
ries.  Instead, it was created with the purpose to remove only the
bad baby cases from liability, which were the cases that prompted
insurers to withdraw coverage and led to limited access to obstet-
ric services.157  This leaves open the option of tort liability for
other obstetric injuries that fall outside the neurological injuries
outlined in the statute.158
To understand the benefits of a no-fault system, a close exami-
nation of the more comprehensive Swedish no-fault compensa-
tion is helpful.  In the early 1970s, Sweden developed a no-fault
system designed to adequately compensate patients injured in
medical treatment.159  Sweden’s Patient Insurance Compensation
Fund distributes awards to those who have suffered iatrogenic
injury, regardless of fault.160  The system operates most similarly
to the United States workers’ compensation system.  All patients
receiving medical care are informed of the Fund, and given infor-
152 Cavanaugh, supra note 19, at 1317 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001 (1990)).
153 Id.
154 Sloan et al., supra note 4, at 39.  In contrast, the Florida no-fault system does
provide pain and suffering compensation, but caps those damages at $100,000. Id. at
37.
155 CORNELL, supra note 53, at 7.
156 Id.
157 Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 130, at 82.
158 The Virginia no-fault system is intended as an exclusive remedy for eligible
participants whose physicians are participating in the program.  Sloan et al., supra
note 4, at 39.  Similarly, in Florida no-fault is intended as an exclusive remedy, but
tort suits have been allowed where a family was not aware of the physician’s partici-
pation in the no-fault program. Id. at 38.
159 Studdert et al., supra note 86, at 5.
160 Id.  Iatrogenic injury describes an injury that was induced by a doctor or treat-
ment. See, e.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1119 (2002).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-1\ORE105.txt unknown Seq: 28 31-OCT-05 12:00
310 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84, 2005]
mation about what to do if they are injured.161  Once a claim is
filed, it is sent to a central office in Stockholm that oversees all
claims.162
Once a claim is deemed eligible, a panel that includes adjustors
and doctors reviews the claim.163  The average claim is resolved
within six months of the time it is filed.164  Nearly 60% of com-
pensation provided by the Fund goes toward pain and suffer-
ing.165  Patients unsatisfied with the outcome of their claim have
two options.  Patients may file for a review of their claim, and
subsequently participate in arbitration.166  Patients are also free,
at any time during the claims process, to file a lawsuit against
their healthcare provider.167  The Fund makes payments periodi-
cally to claimants, and is maintained through county tax contri-
butions.168  In 1996, the Fund distributed the United States
currency equivalent of $28 million, serving a nation of 8.75 mil-
lion people.169  The estimated administrative cost of operating
the Fund was 18% of its budget.170
New Zealand operates a similar no-fault system, authorized by
the Accident Compensation Act of 1972.171  New Zealand’s orig-
inal system was similar to Sweden’s, but has experienced recent
reform to limit costs.  Originally, the New Zealand Fund com-
pensated bodily functions loss, pain and suffering, and loss of en-
joyment of life.172  In 1992, compensation for bodily function loss
and non-economic loss were removed and replaced with an “in-
dependence allowance,” which was given to those whose injury
caused a degree of disability of 10% or more.173  Additionally,
compensation coverage was limited to require periodic physical
assessments of claimants, and termination of compensation to in-
jured patients deemed to be at 85% capacity for work.174




165 Id. at 10.
166 Id. at 6.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 9.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 13.
172 Id. at 15.
173 Id.
174 Id.
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3. Evaluating Current Models
If Oregon were to adopt a no-fault liability system for obstetric
related injuries like other jurisdictions, it may adopt a structure
similar to a no-fault workers’ compensation system or the Vir-
ginia Birth Fund.  There are several benefits unique to a no-fault
system: predictability, assurance that a majority of negligently in-
jured patients will be compensated, weeding out frivolous claims,
and allowing physicians in high-risk practice areas to continue
offering services.
Evaluation of the Virginia program indicates that the no-fault
system has been successful in meeting many goals, but it is not a
perfect system.  The program has led to lower premiums, both in
comparison with the state’s previous system and the national
rates.175  Although it is not mandatory, over 90% of physicians in
the state participate in the program.176
One study of the Virginia and Florida programs found that no-
fault claimants were generally satisfied with the process, and that
satisfaction varied depending on whether the claimant received
compensation.177  No-fault was also effective in lowering attor-
ney costs as compared with tort.178  The effectiveness of Vir-
ginia’s no-fault system in deterring medical negligence is difficult
to measure because data is not gathered on the types of claims
filed, and injuries are not reported to the National Practitioner
Data Bank (as medical malpractice claims are).179  The most
striking advantage to Virginia’s system is its efficiency in the dis-
tribution and administration of compensation.180
Surprisingly, the no-fault system seems to have had little im-
pact on the practice of obstetrics.  Before the no-fault system was
implemented, physicians reportedly quit due to fear of liabil-
ity.181  Consequently, those physicians who remained exper-
ienced a higher number of patients and more work.  Although
implementation of no-fault was expected to alleviate the burden
175 Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 130, at 100.
176 Id.
177 Sloan et al., supra note 4, at 65.
178 Id. at 65.  Most claimants in the no-fault system retained a lawyer for the ad-
ministrative hearings process.  “Overall, it appears that no-fault claimants were
more satisfied with their lawyers than tort claimants.  This satisfaction may be a
reflection of the low legal costs incurred in the no-fault process.” Id.
179 Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 130, at 103.
180 Id. at 113.
181 Id. at 105.
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on obstetricians and increase their willingness to practice, this
was not the case.182  This may be explained by the small number
of cases that were actually diverted from tort.183
The effect of Virginia’s no-fault system on compensation is
also surprising.  On average, four cases are compensated per
year.184  The amount of compensation in no-fault cases was simi-
lar to that of comparable tort cases.185  The lifetime estimated
cost of care for one recipient covered by the Virginia Birth Injury
Program is $1.8 million.186  The no-fault system was successful in
lowering doctors’ insurance premiums: compared with rates
across the nation, obstetric liability premiums in Virginia de-
clined remarkably more rapidly after the adoption of no-fault.187
The most striking difference between the tort and no-fault sys-
tems was the efficiency of compensation, where no-fault was
both faster and lower in cost in administering claims as compared
with tort.188
4. Comparison and Implementation
Basic differences in the size, health care coverage, and welfare
systems of Sweden, New Zealand, and the United States mean
that adoption of a national comprehensive no-fault system is un-
likely in this country.  As one commentator noted, it is difficult to
imagine a no-fault system that also allows for a tort suit in the
United States, a country “where considerably fewer public bene-
fits are available to defray the costs of injuries and propensity to
sue appears to be unrivaled.”189
However, aspects of Sweden’s and New Zealand’s no-fault sys-
tems could likely be implemented in the United States.  New
Zealand’s and Sweden’s approaches to compensation favor those
who have been most severely injured.  New Zealand’s recent re-
form, to reserve compensation for those who are at less than
85% of capacity for work, ensures that those most injured will be
compensated.  While this structure may fail to compensate every
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 106.
185 Id. at 107.
186 E-mail from Candace Thomas, CGFM, Deputy Director, Virginia Birth-Re-
lated Neurological Injury Compensation Program to author (Jan. 13, 2005) (on file
with author).
187 Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 130, at 120.
188 Id. at 108.
189 Studdert et al., supra note 86, at 33.
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injury, it favors the most severely injured.  In contrast, in the
United States the influence of caps and attorneys’ fees perpetu-
ates a system that burdens the claimant190 and is not designed to
compensate the most severely injured.  There is no incentive or
feature of the tort system for plaintiffs’ attorneys and insurers to
ensure awards for the most severely injured.  While it is difficult
to know how Americans would respond to a no-fault obstetric
injury system, the trends of claim reporting in Sweden and New
Zealand suggest that under-claiming would be far less likely
where negligence is not at issue, and where health care providers
have incentives to report and individuals are able to recover
without a lawyer.191
At a minimum, Oregon could dramatically lessen the impact of
medical malpractice litigation on obstetricians through the imple-
mentation of no-fault compensation like that in Virginia.  Critics
of no-fault contend it would do no better than the current tort
system in meeting the goals of compensating the most injured
and deterring negligence.  However, adoption of a limited obstet-
ric no-fault compensation structure, like the one being used in
Virginia, would ensure the most severely injured would be guar-
anteed some payment more promptly.  If modeled similarly to
the Virginia system, no-fault would apply to bad baby cases, and
would effectively remove those cases from the tort system.  How-
ever, the option of tort litigation would remain for other injuries.
Removal of the bad baby cases from the tort system would likely
reduce the burden on insurers and physicians by lowering the
risk of liability.  Another advantage of the no-fault system in ob-
stetric cases is that it would ensure payments for those children
who are severely injured and will require chronic care over their
lifetime.
Alleviating the burden of the current litigation system is criti-
cal in states such as Oregon, where the future availability of ob-
stetricians and their services are in jeopardy.  As one doctor
explained:
I really enjoy obstetrics, and you have to in order to continue
to practice.  We work unusual hours and are often exhausted
and stressed.  We are compensated for really pushing our-
190 See Sloan et al., supra note 4, at 40.  “[A]lthough the vast majority of claims
are accepted by attorneys on a contingent fee basis, claimants ultimately bear the
cost of such fees, whereas, in the no-fault system, the compensation plan pays law-
yers’ fees for claimants.” Id.
191 Studdert et al., supra note 86, at 34.
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selves, sometimes with a cost to our health and families.  It is
therefore difficult to watch salaries decline and add the con-
stant fear of liability or jury awards that exceed our policy
limits.192
By removing the opportunity for a handful of claimants to re-
ceive large awards, adopting a no-fault structure that has been
successful in other states and countries will ensure all deserving
Oregon claimants are compensated and that critical services will
be available.
CONCLUSION
The latest medical malpractice crisis has arrived in Oregon
with a vengeance, and this state’s obstetricians face an increas-
ingly hostile environment in which to practice.  Premiums are ris-
ing, liability risks are increasing, and most importantly there
appears to be no relief in sight.  Although caps were enacted,
they were overturned and twice rejected by state ballot measure,
which indicates they are not a feasible method of reform.  The
legislature’s action to limit premiums in rural areas through
House Bill 3630 is a positive step, but more comprehensive re-
form will be necessary to reach the root of the medical malprac-
tice crisis for obstetricians in Oregon.  A variety of reforms are
needed, and the legislature should consider enacting a limited
no-fault scheme, as well as promoting the use of ADR in medical
malpractice cases.
Adoption of a no-fault system for neurological infant injuries,
similar to the system currently used in Virginia, would alleviate
the burden of litigation on doctors by diverting some cases from
the tort system, but still reserving the option for tort.193  It would
also ensure payments for more injured patients, and would en-
sure that the most seriously injured patients will receive long-
term compensation for their chronic injuries.  As compared with
tort, a no-fault system provides doctors with more incentive to
report incidents because doing so will not result in a great risk of
192 Interview with Anna Daniel, M.D., supra note 23.
193 It is likely that adoption of a no-fault system in Oregon would result in a re-
moval of two to three cases from the tort system.  This estimate is based on the data
that Virginia removes four cases from tort litigation per year.  Bovbjerg & Sloan,
supra note 130, at 106.  Compare Virginia’s population of 7,459,827 with that of Ore-
gon, which is 3,594,586. POPULATION DIV., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1: AN-
NUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION FOR THE UNITED STATES AND STATES, AND
FOR PUERTO RICO (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/
NST-EST2004-01.pdf.
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liability, but will likely result in compensation for the injured.  Fi-
nally, adoption of a no-fault system is beneficial to the public
because it will allow continuation of obstetric services, especially
in rural areas of the state where liability risk poses a greater dan-
ger to small practices.
While imposition of a no-fault system would be a step in the
right direction, it does little to improve the underlying communi-
cation problems between doctors and patients.  One solution to
improving communication is to require mandatory reporting of
all medical errors to enable doctors and patients to better antici-
pate risk.  Additionally, legislation requiring parties to attempt
ADR before litigation may also help to improve communication
between doctors and patients.  In turn, medical training should
utilize reported error information and focus on teaching medical
students how to juggle the many demands of obstetric practice,
while still allowing adequate time for patient interaction and
minimizing error risk.  With the trend toward managed care and
more team-oriented medicine, in which a patient is treated by
several doctors instead of one, effective communication between
doctors and patients is critical and will continue to play an impor-
tant role in preventing medical errors.
Finally, today’s adverse environment for obstetric practice
serves as a reminder that the status quo must be changed.  The
low number of medical students entering the field today indicates
the future of obstetric services in Oregon will be very limited by
the lack of interest in the field and the restricted availability of
services if nothing is done.  Policymakers, attorneys, and insurers
must find some common ground to enact legislation that will im-
prove the current climate of obstetric practice and risk in Ore-
gon.  Without change, patient care will not improve, but instead
services will become concentrated in the few hospitals that are
able to afford insurance to offer a full range of obstetric services.
Our malpractice system should be structured to deter negligent
conduct, improve the quality of and access to care, and ensure
those negligently injured are compensated for their injury.
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